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On the Magic of Law
Abstract
This essay focuses on a forgotten and ill-reputed category, long used by anthropologists and historians to
describe the origins of law: the category of “magic.” At the end of the 19th century, many scholars found in the
idea of “magic” something that could explain why some sort of a necessity could be attached to certain actions,
paroles or rituals from which concrete, practical effects were expected in “primitive” societies. “Magic” was a
concept embodying a complete theory of performance, and of the necessity of the consequences produced by
this performance, that seemed to some of those scholars capable of explaining why necessity and performance
were also legal features. Yet, after World War II, the positivist school of legal historians chose to discard this
explanation, and to forget all about the possible links between law and magic. By re-reading the work of Paul
Huvelin, a forgotten French legal historian close to the circles of Emile Durkheim, I would like to claim that
this gesture was rather a form of foreclosure – foreclosure of the fact that law might very well be the last form
of magic in a world that refuses to admit its existence. Of course, the whole question is: Which magic? How
magic? Why magic? These are the questions that the essay tries to answer.
This journal article is available in Law Text Culture: http://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc/vol21/iss1/7
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On The Magic of Law
Laurent de Sutter*
1. From Lyon to Beirut
Who remembers Paul Huvelin? Despite having been one of the 
few lawyers in the small crowd of scholars gathering around Émile 
Durkheim, he seems to have vanished from memory – his sole 
legacy apparently being a street named after him in the Achrafieh 
neighbourhood of Beirut. This street received some kind of notoriety 
when, in 2011, Mounir Maasri released a movie by the name Rue 
Huvelin which tells the story of a group of students fighting against 
Syrian occupation in Lebanon – all of them living in said street. 
However, no direct reference to the person or the work of Huvelin 
was made in the film, even though the French professor had earned 
some local celebrity, in 1913, for being instrumental in setting up the 
law school of Saint-Joseph University, in the centre of the city. At the 
time, Huvelin had distanced himself slightly from scholarly work, and 
had started to participate in the various attempts made by the French 
government in trying to ensure the persistence of its influence in the 
Middle East – hence the creation of the law school. It was something 
quite unexpected from him, since what had made him famous, as a 
professor at the university of Lyon, was his profound and original 
expertise in the field of Roman law, especially in its most archaic forms. 
From the moment of his inception at the university, in 1899, Huvelin 
had published a bunch of powerful and compelling articles dedicated 
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to various questions of Roman commercial law, gathered into one 
volume by Henri Lévy-Bruhl after the death of their author (Huvelin 
1929). He also had been recruited to serve in the editorial board of 
L’Année sociologique, the journal created by Durkheim in 1898, 
thanks to a friend already introduced to the sociologist, Emmanuel 
Lévy – a lawyer now considered a precursor of legal socialism (Audren 
and Karsenti 2004). But nothing could have predicted that Huvelin 
would suddenly accept missions from the French state, and work as 
a defender of French interests in the Middle East, where he not only 
helped in founding the law school of Saint-Joseph, but also conducted 
research in Syria and other countries. It will most probably never be 
possible to clearly determine the reasons behind this shift in Huvelin’s 
career – a shift parallel to a definite slowing down of his academic 
production, and his growing involvement in the local political life of 
Lyon. The only hypothesis that one could make is that Huvelin would 
never have been content with the mere internal observation of law; 
to him, there always had been more to law than what the growing 
positivism of the time was ready to accept (Audren 2001).
2. Meeting Marcel Mauss
The attraction professed by Huvelin concerning the outside of law was 
probably also what lead him to develop what would become a long 
relationship with someone whose work had an enormous impact on 
his own researches: Marcel Mauss. Before entering the University of 
Lyon, Huvelin had been in charge of the important duty to introduce 
students to Roman law at the University of Aix-en-Provence – where 
he was assistant professor during the academic year 1898-1899. Telling 
his friend Lévy that he was looking for case-study materials concerning 
the study of rituals intended to cure diseases, the latter advised him to 
write to Marcel Mauss, with whom he was acquainted, and ask him 
for ideas. At that time, Mauss, who was 27 (Huvelin was 28), had only 
published a couple of articles, among which a long Essai sur la nature 
et la fonction de sacrifice co-signed with Henri Hubert, and published in 
the journal edited by his uncle, who was no one but Durkheim himself 
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(Hubert and Mauss 1899). Huvelin had read this article, and had 
been impressed by the deep anthropological knowledge manifested by 
Mauss – as he acknowledged openly in his first letter to the latter, 
written on the 9th of June, 1899, so initiating a friendship lasting until 
his own death, in 1924 (Audren 2001: 124). It is, therefore, not a 
surprise that his discussions with Mauss left some traces in his own 
work, starting with his article on Les tablettes magiques et le droit romain 
published in 1901 in the Annales internationales d’histoire (Huvelin 
1901). In this piece, Huvelin was trying to understand the curious link 
existing, in Ancient Rome, between law and what the Romans called 
tabulae defixionum – a device through which a curse could be enforced 
upon another person, so that he or she would obey the cursor. Curses, 
or defixiones, were of many types, and the tablets within which they 
were engraved quite common, not only in Rome, but in the whole 
antique world, especially in Athens (at least, if one was to believe Plato, 
who mentioned them in the Republic and in the Laws) (Graf 2004). 
Among the various types of tabullae, there was one that interested 
Huvelin more than others: the ones concerning defixiones iudicariae, 
namely curses formulated in order to put the adversary into trouble 
in the framework of a judicial procedure. For Huvelin, the rites and 
rituals attached to the practice of cursing pointed towards a mystery 
with which he would keep himself busy during the next decade or so 
– and which would cause a long quarrel with Mauss, who had other 
views on the question: the mystery of the efficient power of law.
3. The Age of Magic
What makes law into something different than a mere set of words 
whose only power would lie in the force of those strong enough to 
make sure that one could not escape the consequences of one’s actions 
– w at makes law something else than brute strength? This was the 
question that started to slowly percolate through Huvelin’s mind, 
although, of course, he did not formulate it in such terms – d spite 
his own attraction for abstract questioning (something that he would 
eventually be criticized for) (Audren 2001: 118). Even though he 
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kept his questioning quite understated, he nevertheless suggested an 
answer that that was both curious and timely: what if, he more or less 
wrote, there was yet something to investigate apropos the relationship 
between law and magic? At the end of the nineteenth century, magic 
had indeed become a fashionable anthropological category, thanks 
to the combined work of people such as Henry Codrington (who 
published The Melanesians in 1891) or James Frazer (the first volume of 
The Golden Bough appeared in 1890) (Codrington 1891; Frazer 1890). 
Yet, even though both Frazer and Codrington pointed out the legal 
or normative dimensions of magic, understood as an abstract force, 
or mana, in certain non-Western civilizations, there was an important 
difference between their findings and Huvelin’s hypothesis. For Frazer, 
magic was what provided an explanation for the interaction existing 
between things or beings without any physical contact whatsoever; it 
was the ‘sympathetic’ force that allowed for the distant influence of 
one being upon another – and that was basically it. Codrington views 
were a little bit more sophisticated, but his description of the mana 
cherished by the Melanesians did not bear any fruitful consequence 
for the general understanding of law: mana was simply some kind 
of an impersonal super-power with whom one had to deal, period. 
According to the Melanesians, argued Codrington, every difference 
of power, be it physical or institutional, should be understood as the 
result of a manifestation of mana – and behind it, of the way someone 
succeeded (or failed) at negotiating a favour from it. Of course, that 
was not what Huvelin had in mind; rather than in supernatural forces, 
or in the sympathetic action of a distant thing upon another, it was in 
the practical functioning of concrete institutions that he was interested, 
even if this functioning would require the performing of rites. To put 
it into more technical terms, what Huvelin was looking for was an 
explanation for the obligatory effect of obligations – since the efficiency 
of law could not be detached from this Roman invention.
4. Birth of a Quarrel
This is precisely where the quarrel with Mauss emerged: one year 
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after the publication of Huvelin’s article, the anthropologist, with 
his old accomplice Hubert, published Esquisse d’une théorie générale 
de la magie again in L’Année sociologique (Hubert and Mauss 1902). 
In this voluminous text, now an absolute classic of human sciences, 
Hubert and Mauss were trying to define what was missing in the 
work of their predecessors, that is the very essence of a magical effect, 
whatever its context or operations. This might have been of a great 
interest for Huvelin, except that Hubert and Mauss decided to open 
their essay with a distinction leaving aside every possibility to connect 
law, be it in its very archaic form, and magic: the distinction between 
magical and obligatory effect (ibid.: 11). Even though they did not 
directly quote Huvelin, the two authors of the Esquisse must have 
had his piece on tabullae defixionum in mind when they wrote that, 
according to them, ‘some’ defended views leading to the confusion of 
what should be carefully distinguished (ibid.). For Hubert and Mauss, 
legal or judicial rites, rituals or formulas, could not be considered 
as magic per se, since they were not producing any direct effect; if 
they did, it was because they were magical or religious besides the 
juridical context of their performance or utterance. For a gesture or a 
parole to be considered as magic, there must be some actual creation, 
some production at work, beyond what Hubert and Mauss called the 
mere establishment of ‘contractual relationships’, as is the case with 
obligations in the field of law (ibid.). This was the reason why they 
allowed themselves not to consider any legal dispositive in the rest of 
the article, preferring to devote themselves to the careful description of 
the ‘elements’ of magic, leading to a general theory of magic as illusion 
and belief (ibid.: 17). Of course, this was quite paradoxical – since the 
efficiency of magic ultimately was, for Hubert and Mauss, the mere 
set of social conventions through which a community would illusion 
itself, so fulfilling some collective needs that could not be fulfilled 
otherwise. Yet, they stayed true to their position; magic, they said, only 
designates the efficiency of shared beliefs, responding to some social 
requirements; as such, it belonged to the realm of representations, and 
not to the realm of reality or of practices (ibid.: 84; Keck 2002). The 
slap in the face was direct; in his piece on curse tablets, Huvelin had 
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precisely advocated that there was something practical to the very idea 
of magic, and that law could illustrate what a magical practice could be; 
but Hubert and Mauss would not listen.
5. Huvelin Strikes Back
It took several years to Huvelin to offer a reply to Hubert and Mauss’ 
Esquisse – years during which he was very much involved in the 
preparation of his classes in Roman law, and in the history of commercial 
law, his two domains of expertise. When he finally published Magie et 
droit individuel in 1905, he had made one major step: he had been 
appointed to the editorial board of L’Année sociologique – where he 
eventually published his cryptic answer to his friend’s views on law and 
magic (Huvelin 1905). Between Mauss and Huvelin, the quarrel had 
never been opened; it was more of an erudite conversation between 
persons of good manners, so that there never was a bitter comment, or 
even an open disapproval, formulated on one side or the other. Magie 
et droit individuel was not different on that respect; it even opened with 
an overt praise for Hubert et Mauss’ piece, presented as a ‘decisive step’ 
in the history of the scientific study of magic, and the benchmark for 
any future research on the topic (ibid.: 1). Obviously, some sort of a 
disagreement was to be expected – but it only appeared after a couple 
of pages of compliments, when Huvelin started to wonder about the 
normativity at stake with the social order from which magic seems to 
stem. If Hubert and Mauss were right in saying that, on the one hand, 
magic was of a social nature, and, on the other, that there was something 
mysterious to it, bringing it to the verge of the prohibited, then some 
reason must be advanced for the contradiction to be functional. How 
a social feature could be social, if it is at the same time prohibited by 
the very society that it should help functioning, asked Huvelin; are we 
not obliged to slightly revise our understanding of what a society is, or 
of what magic is? Or else, he added, would it not be interesting to go 
back to the facts, in order to try and see how some kind of conciliation 
could be possible between the two – a conciliation developing from 
the careful examination of the ‘practical applications’ of magic? (ibid.: 
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3) When asking these questions, there was no doubt that Huvelin 
was thinking about law; and if there still was a doubt, it would soon 
vanish, since he added a correlate to what was said before – and a 
correlate taken from Durkheim himself. Since, as the sociologist had 
written in his De la division du travail social, in 1893, ‘law constitutes 
the visible symbol of social solidarity’, and so the very incarnation of 
social normativity, it was in the law that the theory of magic would find 
its true grounding (ibid.: 4). Of course, it all depended on which kind 
of law one was talking about.
6. Formalism Unlimited
At first sight, though, Huvelin was much more modest; rather than 
criticizing Hubert and Mauss’ distinction, he started by emphasizing it, 
stating that, indeed the realm of the juridical and the one of the magical 
should be kept separate. Yet, in a footnote where all of his controversy 
with Mauss was summarized in a few polite sentences, he deemed to 
question not the distinction itself, or the understanding of the concept 
of magic defended in Esquisse, but the concept of law used there 
(ibid. n. 4). For Hubert and Mauss, Huvelin wrote, law must be kept 
separated from magic on the ground that whereas the latter is based 
on rituals, the former, on the contrary, lies upon convention – upon the 
exchange of will expressed by two parties. Being an expert in the most 
ancient forms of Roman law, he could not let such a characterization 
of law go unnoticed, and reminded Hubert and Mauss of the fact that 
the link between law and convention was nothing but problematic 
– to say the least. The Roman legal system of the first years of the 
Kingdom was indeed not based on conventions, but on forms, namely 
‘the forms themselves that create or extinguish rights, independently 
from any condition of will’, Huvelin argued in his footnote. ‘Will 
without form produces no effect’, in such a system – whose antiquity 
should not induce us to think that it constituted some past curiosity, 
devoid of any relationship with law as it was to be grasped in a more 
general way (ibid.). On the contrary, formalism was a key feature of 
the Roman legal system up to the time of the Justinian codification, 
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and a constant of law up to the present time, as was illustrated by the 
doctrinal theory of the ‘declaration of will’, later studied by Raymond 
Saleilles (1901). Even though Huvelin did not go that far, one could 
easily have deduced from his demonstration that the exchange of will 
through which a convention could be formed was precisely this: the 
form of the convention – formalism still permeating under the veil 
of conventionalism. For on reading Huvelin’s development closely, 
it should have been clear that the French professor did not believe 
that the distinction made by Hubert and Mauss should be kept intact 
– contrarily to what he himself explicitly declared a few sentences 
before. Because, was not the most striking trait of rituals precisely 
that of heir formalism? Was not ritualism formalism merely put into 
gestures, actions and formulas? And then, was not law, understood as 
the practice of formalism, the very place where something could be 
understood about magic, too?
7. Durkheim against Durkheim
What Huvelin was interested in was the efficiency of the form; this 
was precisely why he could not accept the quick dismissal found in the 
Esquisse of the role of law in an inquiry of what ‘efficiency’ means; but 
this also is why he could not accept Durkheim’s views either. Indeed, 
choosing to quote Durkheim in order to contradict Hubert and Mauss 
was a bold, as well as paradoxical, operation – since its final outcome 
took the form of a theory of law that was alien to both Durkheim’s and 
Hubert and Mauss’ views at the same time. In their Esquisse, the latters 
deliberately applied the main lessons of the former, in their choosing 
of the explanandum of the success of magic in societies still functioning 
with other rules and principles as, say, the European ones. For them, 
magic was mainly a social affair – and so it was the structure of said 
societies that could explain why their members were to believe in the 
efficiency of what had so obviously none (outside of the consequences 
of the belief themselves). The rest only belonging to anthropological 
idiosyncrasies, whose description was of a great importance for the 
comparative study of human forms of social life, but not for the general 
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understanding of what a society is – so that it could be left aside. 
Huvelin had another take on this point; for him, the details of the 
rituals were precisely what mattered, because, being a lawyer, he knew 
that if anything happens in the world, it is because of details being 
carefully envisaged; take out the details, and the big picture crumbles. 
Society never entails any effect; what entails an effect always is one 
singular detail, one specific gesture or given set of words, inserted into a 
broader context that only provides the ecology for this detail to lead to 
the results being expected from it to produce. This was the reason why 
Magie et droit individuel so much resembled an anthology of disparate 
cases and examples from which no overarching story seemed to unfold, 
and about which no explanation seemed completely satisfactory. In the 
course of his listing of cases, Huvelin would only offer glimpses at a 
possible general view, through short sentences resounding like hard-
to-decipher oracles, left suspended in the air, waiting for someone to 
interpret them in one way or another. Yet, there was a moment when 
the type of efficiency looked for by Huvelin as far as law and magic 
were concerned somehow crystallized: the moment when he started 
to answer the question of the obligatory effect of convention – the 
question of what, in conventions, exceeded conventions.
8. Nexum, what else?
During a long period of time, said Huvelin, contracting and executing 
contracts was possible one the sole grounds of magic; it was magic 
that made it so that contracts could have any effect, and that this 
effect could somehow be binding for the parties. To put it differently, 
what made magic effective in contracts was the necessity of the 
obligation at the core of any contract, from the very inception of the 
notion of obligation in the Law of the Twelve Tables, to its canonical 
formulation in Justinian’s Digest. The first example given by Huvelin 
is the one of nexum – about which he had just provided a personal 
interpretation in an article featured in the monumental Dictionnaire des 
antiquités grecques et romaines edited by Edmond Saglio and Edmond 
Pottier (Huvelin 1907; Benthien 2011). The nexum was a very curious 
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institution of early Roman law providing some sort of guarantee for 
the creditor of a debt to see the due sum being paid by the debtor, 
when the latter did not have such a sum in his possession, and should 
be left free to try and collect it. In order to ensure this freedom did 
not metamorphose into a pure and simple escape, a hostage would 
usually be provided to the debtor, preferably someone so close to the 
debtor that he would not even consider not coming back (Girard 2003; 
Noailles 1940). Of course, there were cases when there was no such 
hostage at hand, and another trick was needed; this trick, according to 
Huvelin’s interpretation of the nexum, was the personal involvement 
of the debtor, making himself the hostage, while remaining free of his 
moves (Huvelin 1905). But then again, how to guarantee that, once the 
nexum duly formed, the debtor would not simply run away, laughing at 
the fool who was stupid enough to be satisfied with the mere promise 
that he would come back as a hostage if he could not find the money? 
The answer, wrote Huvelin, was magic; more specifically, it was the 
magic of some ritual cursing, implying that the person who would not 
fulfil his duties would be subjected to the worst fate, a threat apparently 
sufficient to make people do what they had to do (ibid.). This is how 
conventions started to take place: as the personal engagement of a 
debtor, accepting to submit himself to a ritual leading to his potential 
cursing if he were not to perform his part of what was not yet a 
contract – but almost. The most important fact, though, was not so 
much that magic could be linked to the guaranteeing of contracts, but 
that it revealed, contrarily to what Hubert and Mauss had assumed, 
that contracts were not the result of a mere exchange of will; contracts 
first implied an individual involvement (ibid.: 27).
9. In Praise of the Individual
Hubert and Mauss never really replied to Huvelin’s critique; but one 
could imagine that, at this stage, they would have simply sniffed and 
argued that such a description of the origins of legal obligations did 
not change a thing with respect to what they wrote, since, in the end, 
it was still about society. For someone to submit oneself to a ritual, 
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and act accordingly, there must have been some social belief leading 
to the internalization of the supposed normative power attached 
to it; as such, it was not the cursing that produced effects, but the 
belief itself. Huvelin would not completely disagree; as he pointed out 
later in Magie et droit individuel the social dimension of conventions 
should not be overlooked; there must be some ‘social adherence’ (as 
he put it) to them; but it should not be overstated, too. There was, he 
claimed, a specific ‘force’ of magic – and what happened with early 
forms of conventions, such as nexum, was the transference of this force 
to what he called ‘individual activity’, making so that the individual’s 
involvement in a legal relationship could become stronger (ibid.: 42). 
What mattered was not so much the social dimension of magic, or the 
fact that it eventually was grounded on shared beliefs, but the fact that 
there was an effective change in the force of the subject accepting to 
participate to its own cursing as debtor. The magic was the magic of this 
sudden possibility – of making so that a given individual was provided, 
whatever the reality of it, a power exceeding the one at his disposal as 
a common body, as a person more or less free to come and go in the 
world. The magical dimension of a convention was that: the fact that 
it did effectively change something in the debtor – the fact that it gave 
him the power to grant his acceptance to submit himself to a ritual 
making him able to participate in an obligatory relationship. Indeed, 
this was hard to explain in terms of social normativity; it was rather 
the functional necessity of a given dispositive that was at stake with 
the phenomenon described by Huvelin – its internal necessity, rather 
than the external necessity of the social context in which it took place. 
Whereas Huber and Mauss, closer to the sociological orthodoxy of 
Durkheim, focused on the social dimension of magic, and so expelled 
law from its realm (being another social phenomenon), Huvelin 
wanted to outline the importance of the individual. Even more so, he 
wanted to stress that the individual could not be considered separately 
from the institutions granting it a given place in society, and the power 




Despite his blow to the Durkheimian orthodoxy, Huvelin stayed in the 
editorial board of L’Année sociologique until the end of its first series, 
in 1913 – even though he did not publish any new article, satisfying 
himself with book reviews here and there. Law was too exotic a topic 
to really lead to any controversy within the sociological entourage of 
Durkheim; the fact is that Huvelin was the only one, with Lévy, to 
possess the full range of technical knowledge of the discipline; the 
others were only remotely interested (Cotterrell 2005). This might 
explain why, at the time, no one seemed to notice Huvelin’s claims 
– or, to put it in more direct terms, his radical critique of sociology, 
and of the elementary conception of normativity defended by his 
friends and colleagues. For the latter, normativity was an overarching 
phenomenon, of which law was only a mere illustration, emerging at 
a certain moment of history, in a certain context, in order to answer 
certain social needs – even though this illustration was deemed capital. 
For the former, normativity, so conceived, could not explain the specific 
force manifested by law, nor the singularity of the functioning of its 
dispositives; it would only make law the accessory of something else, 
more general and more important. Of course, at the end of Magie et 
droit individuel, Huvelin conceded that, if law and magic had something 
in common, it was because they shared some sort of belonging to the 
realm of religion and the sacred – both stemmed, in a twisted way, 
from religious beliefs. Yet, as he put it, ‘in the field of law, magical rites 
only are religious rites diverted from their regular social goal, and used 
in order to achieve an individual will of belief […] The magical rite is 
religious in its external appearance; it is antireligious only in it ends’. 
(Huvelin 1905: 46) It was a clever way to state that, on the one hand, 
the antinomy defended by Hubert and Mauss was not sustainable; 
and that, on the other hand, the most crucial aspects of Durkheim’s 
sociology could be maintained untouched – somehow. For a careful 
reader, however, the gap separating the attempt at grounding the 
efficiency of magic and of law in different areas of the social, from the 
desire to understand this efficiency as an integral part of a dispositive 
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centred upon individuals, was abyssal. Hubert and Mauss, like their 
master Durkheim, wanted society to provide the alpha and omega of 
normativity, whereas Huvelin was persuaded that there was no such 
thing as normativity, but only tiny legal mechanisms requiring per se 
analysis.
11. A Criticism by Georges Gurvitch
A few years after Huvelin’s death, though, an attempt was made by 
Georges Gurvitch, in a study titled La magie et le droit, published in his 
book Essais de sociologie, to prove the latter wrong, and, conversely, to 
prove Durkheim, and then Hubert and Mauss, right (Gurvitch 1938). 
According to Gurvitch, Huvelin committed a very important mistake: 
his demonstration was based on some sort of circular reasoning, leaving 
aside the fact that it had to presuppose the existence of an individual 
right in order to open the floor for magic (ibid.: 40). Indeed, one could 
question the importance of magic in the definition of a right, if this 
right was already recognized by the one trying to assert it without its 
intervention; in Huvelin’s argument, magic was simply playing the 
role of indifferent decorum. For Gurvitch, on the contrary, magic 
was something big; first of all, it had to be spelled with a major ‘M’, 
something that neither Huvelin, nor even Hubert and Mauss, dared to 
do, as if it was a kind of major instance, to whom a very special type 
of respect was due. And indeed, it was the case: as Gurvitch stated it, 
the concept of magic was a way to investigate what he called the ‘spirit’ 
of law, even though one had to be careful in avoiding to make it the 
‘cause’ of law, and to describe it only in its ‘influences’. (ibid.: 39, 41) 
Of course, in the end, things came back from where they started, and 
Gurvitch was forced to admit that magic, as he saw it, was again a set 
of beliefs of the same kind as, say, religious beliefs – which amounted to 
the very radical conclusion that beliefs might influence law. In reality, 
the purpose of Gurvitch’s criticism was to try and demonstrate that 
Huvelin should have made one further step, and include in his analysis 
what he called ‘social law’, namely the set of rules and mechanisms 
exceeding the limits of individual conventions (ibid.: 71). Even though 
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his own arguments were a little bit shabby, his purpose was rightful: 
Huvelin’s view could have been more powerful if he had accepted that 
individual rights were not the place of ultimate realization of magic 
in law – or, at least, not only. If one were to get rid of the abstraction 
of social normativity, one should have to take into consideration 
the inner efficiency of the whole set of mechanisms through which 
something other than individual bonds can be legally produced. Was 
it not possible to imagine that magic could permeate through law in a 
more general way than the one stated by Huvelin, that is, allowing for 
the conclusion of a nexum in order to guarantee a debt – or the judicial 
cursing at stake with tabullae defixionum? Gurvitch’s criticism was not 
that bad, after all.
12. Towards Magical Legal Realism
Despite its limitations and the lack of echo that it received from both 
sociologists and lawyers, Huvelin’s hypothesis benefitted from a life 
of its own, somehow finding its way through the underground of 
legal scholarship, up to the present day. If the French school of legal 
history appearing after World War Two openly excommunicated 
any views that might have even a remote relationship with the idea 
of religion and of magic, the more recent era seems to become more 
favourable to their re-examination (Gaudemet 2000). Huvelin’s work 
was mentioned in both the Dictionnaire encyclopédique de théorie et 
de sociologie du droit, edited in 1991 by André-Jean Arnaud, and the 
Dictionnaire historique des juristes français, edited in 2007 by Patrick 
Arabeyre, Jean-Louis Halpérin and Jacques Krynen (Arnaud 1997; 
Arabeyre,  Halpérin and Krynen 2007). In the interval between these 
two publications, some of Huvelin’s letters to Marcel Mauss had finally 
been edited, with an introduction, by Frédéric Audren, and the general 
context of his work, in particular its Durkheimian dimension, has been 
outlined by Roger Cotterrell (Audren 2001; Cotterrell 2005). Other 
works followed, testifying to a renewal of curiosity in the generation 
of lawyers represented by Huvelin and Lévy, especially from the 
point of view of their relationship to ideas customarily seen as far 
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removed from contemporary lawyers’ preoccupations, such as socialism 
(Audren and Karsenti 2004). Yet most of these different endeavours, 
while finally recognizing the historical importance of Huvelin, have 
remained remarkably discrete about his attempts at grounding the 
necessary force of obligations in magic – as if this still represented 
an embarrassment. Outside France (and the United Kingdom), 
however, there were attempts at engaging with it, most notably Kaius 
Tuori in Finland, who decided to follow the path opened by another 
important lawyer having considered magic with a favourable eye: Axel 
Hägerström. In his treatise on the roman concept of obligation, 1927, 
Hägerström indeed discussed the idea that obligations, in Roman law, 
originated in rites being performed, from which obligations received 
their own power – quoting Huvelin himself (Hägerström 1927). 
For him, too, the very idea of necessity at the core of any obligation 
required an explanation that could not have been found in the mere 
social context within which such an obligation would take place, or 
in the beliefs of the participants to the rite. A few years later, in 1940, 
in his famous book On Law and the State, Karl Olivecrona quoted 
Hägerström’s theory, adding that, contrary to what one might think, 
magical thinking was still a part of the functioning of law, if one was to 
see it realistically (Olivecrona 2011).
13. Meanwhile, in the United States
The place of Hägerström and Olivecrona in the history of legal theory 
is well known; both are considered as the fathers, and most prominent 
figures, of what has been called Scandinavian Legal Realism, a school 
of thought still highly considered today. Their main claim was that law 
should not be considered metaphysically, as according to them was the 
case then, but realistically, that is, without the philosophical apparatus, 
and the call to transcendence that were the feature of the legal theory 
of their time. Legal realism, according to Olivecrona, was the realism 
that refused to consider law from the point of view of ‘mysticism’, and 
instead chose to consider it from the point of view of ‘science’ – refusing 
to provide grounding for law, and choosing instead to describe it (ibid.: 
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45). Yet, for Olivecrona, it seemed that ‘magical thinking’ should be put 
in the context of ‘science’ rather than of ‘mysticism’, as far as law was to be 
considered, since magical rituals provided a more accurate description of 
its obligatory force than other explanations (ibid.). Magic was an inherent 
feature of realism – it was the acceptance of how certain early forms of law 
needed magic in order to work, that defined the type of ‘science’ that the 
tenets of Scandinavian Legal Realism advanced. And the fact was that 
Hägerström and Olivecrona were right in claiming so, since they were 
not the only type of realists calling for magic as a central category of legal 
scholarship; before them, the most important American Legal Realist 
of all times did the same. In his celebrated address to the students of 
Boston University, in 1896, The Path of the Law, Oliver Wendell Holmes 
Jr. also suggested that true realism had something to do with magical 
rites, under the form of what he called ‘prophecy’, a curious word for 
such a rationalist (de Sutter 2014). If, seen from the present days, this 
seems to be quite paradoxical, it was not for the time – a time when some 
of the greatest thinkers, such as Holmes’ friend William James and his 
French colleague Henri Bergson, were both proud to chair the newly 
formed Society for Psychical Research. It was a part of the rationalism 
of the time, even of the pragmatism of the time, to interest oneself, in 
a constructive way, in all the phenomena apparently evading human 
rationality, to try to expand rationalism’s ambit to new realms, beyond 
the limitations imposed by any theoretical tradition (Menand 2002). 
When Holmes addressed his students, Codrington and Frazer were the 
hottest read one could hope for – and the lawyer was perfectly aware 
of their discussion of the entanglement between law, magic and power.
14. The Psychology of Formalism
The end of the nineteenth century, and beginning of the twentieth, 
was a moment when magic was everywhere, especially in societies 
and civilizations foreign from the Western ones, so that they could 
provide a useful contrast to either criticize or praise them. Huvelin’s 
work provides a perfect example of the type of questioning that such 
an omnipresence of the category of law could lead to, even though 
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there was more to this than a mere historical remnant, as Tuori has 
understood better than others. Recalling the Scandinavian tradition 
of magical legal realism, the Finnish scholar dedicated some time 
and effort in trying to weigh the interest of Huvelin’s reading of 
nexum and the origins of the Roman concept of obligatio from the 
point of view of contemporary science. In a much celebrated piece 
on The Magic of Mancipatio, Tuori tried to reconsider the traditional 
accounts given of the very specific procedure that mancipatio is, in its 
connexion to earlier forms of what were not yet contracts, such as the 
one of nexum (Tuori 2008). He cautiously concluded that here was no 
definite evidence, in one direction or the other, to assess the magical 
dimension of mancipatio, even if this procedure indeed involved some 
sort of ritual – or, at least, as he called it, some sort of ‘formalism’ (ibid.: 
481). This, already, was a nod towards Huvelin’s views, since the first 
criticism that the latter opposed to Hubert and Mauss was precisely 
the fact that they overlooked the formalistic dimension of the archaic 
manifestations of law, and then of law in general. But Tuori went even 
further; he stated that even if there were no obvious connection to the 
supernatural involved in mancipatio, this did not mean that magic was 
not a part of the forms involved at the time; it simply implied that these 
form were not religious. The weakest point of Huvelin’s argumentation, 
justifying Gurvitch’s regret, namely his attempt at justifying the social 
role of magic through religion, and then forgetting social law itself, was 
redeemed by a more clear-cut distinction. As Tuori wrote, ‘[t]he fact 
that this legal ritual did not refer to the supernatural realm does not 
mean that its psychological effect would not have resembled that of 
magic’ (ibid.), meaning that the performance of a ritual could produce 
such an effect in itself. Of course, the distinction was immediately 
undermined by the fact that, according to Tuori, the question was 
‘psychological’ more than anything else; the functional dimension 
of magic within the ritual was not something that he was ready to 
consider, despite his insistence upon its ‘performative’ character (ibid.)
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15. The Inner Necessity of Law
Maybe this was the last word on the question of magic: ‘performative’ 
– a word that has been introduced into the legal vocabulary due to 
the success of (the examples of ) the linguistic theory of the speech-
act developed in the late 1950s by John Austin (Austin 1970). Yet, 
compared to what has now become an evergreen of legal theory, 
Huvelin’s ideas about the magic of law rested upon a very different 
ground, since Austin’s speech-act was an act only insofar as there 
was an institutional context justifying the power of the one acting. 
Despite its apparent formalism, the speech-act theory was again some 
sort of sociologism, albeit under linguistic disguise, whereas Huvelin 
was only interested in the inner functioning of the legal act, and the 
way magic could provide for the necessity of its consequences. What 
Huvelin wanted was a theory of the legal act that was not dependent 
upon the person who would utter the word (or make the gestures), but 
on the words (or the gestures) themselves – and not because of their 
meaning, but because of their, say, ‘genre’. There must be a certain type 
of words or actions that can be called ‘magic’, and whose use within 
a legal context produces necessary consequences, whatever the social 
context is – and even, if one is to follow Tuori, whatever the religious 
context is. There must be an inner necessity of law, or else it is only void – 
that is, pure force, pure application of the relationship of power within 
a certain group of human beings, pure legitimization of something 
that would have happened anyway. Of course, this might very well be 
possible, but then why do people insist so much upon law? Is it because 
it would only be the ideological veil with which the darn truth was 
covered, so that ‘people’ behaved? The reality is that, as weak and as 
ideological as it might be, law still has an existence in itself – and this 
existence cannot be denied by even the most ferocious critique of law 
or the most encompassing sociological theory of the norm. If there 
is something like law, then there must be something, in it that could 
evade any attempt at providing an external justification or explanation 
of its existence and functioning; this is precisely what Huvelin was 
looking for and that he found, thanks to the concept of magic. What 
he found was the inner necessity of the form, understood not in the 
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sense of respect due to some formalities, but in the most specific sense 
of forming – the giving of shape to what had none before, for instance 
giving the shape of a debtor to someone who, before, was simply owing 
money to somebody else.
Endnotes
* Professor of Legal Theory at Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium
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